Abstract. The admissible rules of a logic are those rules under which the set of theorems of the logic is closed. In a previous paper by the authors, formal systems for deriving the admissible rules of Intuitionistic Logic and a class of modal logics were defined in a proof-theoretic framework where the basic objects of the systems are sequent rules. Here, the framework is extended to cover derivability of the admissible rules of intermediate logics and a wider class of modal logics, in this case, by taking hypersequent rules as the basic objects.
Introduction
Investigations into logical systems typically focus on the derivability of formulas or other structures within the system. However, the admissibility of rules for the system may also play a key role. A rule is admissible for a logic (viewed as a consequence relation) if adding it to the logic produces no new theorems. Such a notion is of interest in Computer Science for (at least) two reasons. First, admissible rules show that the derivability of certain formulas implies the derivability of stronger formulas, in the sense that the latter derive the former but not vice versa, an example being the disjunction property, where the derivability of a disjunction implies that one of the disjuncts is derivable. Second, equational unification can be formulated in terms of admissible rules. A formula A is unifiable for a consistent logic L iff σA is a theorem of L for some substitution σ. But this is equivalent to the claim that the rule A/q is not admissible in L for any variable q not occurring in A. Finally, admissible rules are also interesting from an algebraic perspective: they correspond to quasi-equations holding in the free algebra with countably many generators (or the Lindenbaum algebra of the logic).
Classical Logic has no non-derivable admissible rules; that is, it is structurally complete. However, for non-classical logics, this is no longer the case, and it is an interesting and often quite challenging task to provide characterizations of admissibility for these logics. In the case of modal and intermediate logics, a wide range of results for admissible rules such as decidability and complexity have been obtained, in particular by Rybakov [13] . Axiomatic-style presentations have been provided for wide classes of intermediate logics by Iemhoff [7, 8] (the case of Intuitionistic Logic was considered independently by Rozière [12] ) and modal logics by Jeřábek [10] , both making crucial use of Ghilardi's work on unification and projective approximations [4, 5] .
In [9] , the current authors introduced a proof-theoretic framework for admissibility: analytic "Gentzen-style" proof systems for deriving the admissible rules of both Intuitionistic Logic and a class of "extensible" modal logics including K4, S4, and GL. The key idea of this approach is that just as calculi for derivability in these logics can often be presented using sequents, so the corresponding systems for admissibility can be presented using sequent rules as basic objects. Here, we extend this approach to both a class of intermediate logics, including De Morgan Logic KC and the bounded cardinality logics BC 1 , BC 2 , . . ., and a wider class of "mono-extensible" modal logics, including logics such as GL.3, S4.2, etc. In this case, however, the natural home for derivability is not sequents, but the framework of hypersequents -intuitively, disjunctions of sequents -introduced by Avron in [1] and used to define calculi for families of both intermediate logics (see e.g. [3] ) and fuzzy logics (see e.g. [11] ). Hence, for admissibility in these logics, the basic objects of our systems will be hypersequent rules.
Admissible Rules
Let us assume for this paper that the logic L is treated as a consequence relation based on a propositional language with binary connectives ∧, ∨, →, a constant ⊥, and sometimes also a modal connective . Other connectives are then defined as:
We denote (propositional) variables by p, q, r, . . ., formulas by A, B, C, . . ., and finite sets of formulas by Γ, Π, Σ, ∆, Θ, Ψ . Formulas p → q and p are called variable implications and boxed variables, respectively. We also write Γ and Γ where ∅ = ⊥ and ∅ = for iterated disjunctions and conjunctions of formulas in a finite set Γ , and make use of the abbreviations:
Typically, logical rules are asymmetric, having many premises but just one conclusion. However, for admissibility, it is convenient to treat instead generalized rules of the form Γ ∆, where both Γ and ∆ are sets of formulas. Intuitively, such a rule is admissible for a logic L if whenever a substitution makes all the premises theorems of L, it also makes one of the conclusions a theorem. More precisely, an L-unifier for a formula A is a substitution σ such that L σA.
Example 1. A nice example of an admissible generalized rule for Intuitionistic Logic is the disjunction property, formulated as p ∨ q p, q.
Lemma 1. Let L be an intermediate logic or a normal extension of K4:
The result then follows from (b). For (d), as for (c), we get that
The other direction is almost immediate.
Modal Logics
In [9] , formal systems were defined for deriving the admissible rules of extensible modal logics by taking sequent rules as basic objects. Below, we recall this characterization and show that it can be extended to a wider class of logics that we call mono-extensible by taking our basic objects to be hypersequent rules.
Extensible and Mono-Extensible Modal Logics
For a comprehensive account of modal logics, see e.g. [2] . Let us just recall that for any normal modal logic L, an L-frame is such that every model on that frame is a model of L, and an L-model is a model based on an L-frame. L has the finite model property FMP if every refutable formula is refutable on a finite L-frame. For a Kripke model K with accessibility relation R, the root of K is the cluster {k : ∀l = k(kRl)}, and K k denotes the Kripke model K restricted to the domain {l : kRl or k = l}. Two Kripke models K 1 , K 2 are variants of one another if they have the same nodes and accessibility relation, and their forcing relations agree on all nodes except possibly the root.
Ghilardi [5] has given a characterization for projectivity for a wide range of modal logics (following here the terminology of [10] ).
Theorem 1 (Ghilardi [5] ). A class of finite models K has the modal extension property if for any model K, whenever K k ∈ K for all k not in the root of K, there is a variant of K in K. For every normal extension L of K4 with the FMP, a formula is L-projective iff its class of L-models has the modal extension property.
To get a handle on the modal extension property, we recall two useful constructions.
i and ( F j ) r are obtained by adding, respectively, an irreflexive or a reflexive node beneath (connected to all nodes of) the disjoint sum of F 1 . . . F n . A normal extension L of K4 with the FMP is extensible if for all finite L-frames F 1 , . . . , F n :
L is mono-extensible if it satisfies the above for n = 1; that is, for each finite L-frame F :
L is linear-extensible if it is mono-extensible and linear; i.e. all rooted L-frames are
Every extensible logic L obeys the modal disjunction property:
Significant examples of these logics include K4, S4, Grz, and GL. Linear-extensible logics (treated in [10] ), which include the logics S4.3, K4.3, and GL.3, and clearly do not satisfy the modal disjunction property, are the most obvious examples of mono-extensible but not extensible logics.
Other interesting examples include the logics S4.2, K4.2, and GL.2 (also discussed in [10] ) which are mono-extensible but neither extensible nor linear-extensible.
Sequent Systems for Extensible Logics
Gentzen systems for derivability in many non-classical logics, in particular core modal logics, can be obtained in the framework of sequents. Since order and multiplicity of formulas is unimportant in the context of modal logics, we define a sequent S here as an ordered pair of finite sets of formulas, written Γ ⇒ ∆. Such a sequent is said to be
To obtain Gentzen-style proof systems for admissibility in extensible modal logics, it is convenient again to use sequents, but this time at the level of rules. A generalized sequent rule (gs-rule for short) R is an ordered pair of finite sets of sequents, written:
. Hence a proof system for the admissibility of gs-rules is also a proof system for the admissibility of generalized rules, and of course, rules in the usual sense.
Rules (now at the next level up) for gs-rules are sets of rule instances, each consisting of a set of premises R 1 , . . . , R n and a conclusion R; instances with no premises being called initial gs-rules. They are defined here schematically, using p, q to stand for variables, A, B for formulas, Γ, Π, Σ, ∆, Θ, Ψ for sets of formulas, S for sequents, and G, H for sets of sequents. We call all sequents not in G or H for instances of such rules, principal sequents. Such rules are L-sound if whenever |∼ L R i for i = 1 . . . n, then |∼ L R, and L-invertible, if whenever |∼ L R, then |∼ L R i for i = 1 . . . n. Calculi for extensible modal logics are defined in this framework as follows:
Initial GS-Rules and Structural Rules
Anti-Cut and Projection Rules
where
where p does not occur in G, H, Γ , ∆, A in ( ⇒) and (⇒ ) .
Fig. 1. Core Modal Rules
where Θ ∪ Ψ ⊆ {A, A} and Θ, Ψ = ∅. (1) GAML extends the core modal rules of Figure 1 .
|∼ L R iff GAML R for any gs-rule R.
Note that the right logical rules of Figure 1 are just usual rules for modal logics embedded into the gs-rule framework, and that the non-modal left logical rules are obtained from these rules by replacing the conclusion sequent with the premise sequents (including (⊥ ⇒), an instance of (W) but included here for uniformity). The (non-invertible) modal rules, ( ⇒) and (⇒ ) , decompose modal formulas on the left by replacing the formula A in A by a new variable p, soundness following from the fact that any substitution for the conclusion can be extended (since p does not occur there) by subsituting A for p. The "projection rule" (PJ) allows sequents on the left to be used as modal implications on the right, corresponding to the fact that derivability implies admissibility, while the "anti-cut" rule (AC) corresponds directly to the fact that the usual cut rule is admissible in the logic. The more complicated "Visser rules" (V i ) and (V r ) reflect the existence of non-derivable admissible rules for irreflexive and reflexive logics.
Example 2. In particular, we can obtain calculi for K4, GL, and S4 by adding (from left to right) the first rule for K4, the second rule for GL, and the first and the third for S4:
to the core modal rules, with (V i ) for GL, (V r ) and (AC ) for S4, and all three for K4.
Hypersequent Systems for Mono-Extensible Logics
To deal with mono-extensible modal logics, we move beyond the sequent level. In particular, adapting slightly the usual definition (see e.g. Avron [1] ), we define a hypersequent to be a finite non-empty set of sequents, written S 1 | . . . | S n , and let L G iff
. Hypersequent calculi are particularly useful for characterizing intermediate logics (see e.g. [3] ) and logics characterized by linearly ordered structures [11] . An example of both is a calculus for the intermediate and fuzzy Gödel-Dummett Logic LC, defined by adding a single rule to a hypersequent version of Gentzen's calculus LJ for Intuitionistic Logic.
Extending gs-rules to the hypersequent case, a generalized hypersequent rule (ghrule for short) R is an ordered pair of sets of hypersequents, written:
If m ≤ 1, then R is called a single-conclusion gh-rule (sgh-rule for short).
A core set of rules for mono-extensible logics is obtained from the core modal rules by adding a context variable G in the premises and conclusion standing for an arbitrary context hypersequent; e.g. (⇒ ∧) becomes: Definition 2. The gh-version R h of a rule schema R for gs-rules is obtained by replacing each principal sequent S in R by G | S for a fixed hypersequent variable G.
Our starting point for a calculus for a mono-extensible modal logic L is rules on the right of the symbol that provide a sound and complete calculus for L-derivability. We then expand this calculus with hypersequent versions of the core modal rules, and versions of the appropriate Visser rules (V i ) and (V r ).
Definition 3.
A calculus GAML is L-fitting for a mono-extensible modal logic L if:
(1) GAML extends the gh-versions of the core modal rules.
Example 3. For non-reflexive logics, we can use (V i ) as follows, noting that the top gh-rule is easily seen to be derivable using rules for K4 on the right:
Let L be a mono-extensible modal logic.
(a) All the core modal rules are L-sound.
(c) If L is reflexive (equivalently, an S4-extension), then (V r ) h and (AC ) are L-sound.
Proof. Many parts of this proof are exactly as in the extensible case considered in [9] . It remains only to check the soundness of the Visser rules (V i ) h and (V r ) h . For the former, it is sufficient to show
Since L has the FMP, let K be a finite L-model refuting σI (G | { Γ ⇒ C : C ∈ ∆}) and let F be the frame of K. L is monoextensible and irreflexive, so F i is also an L-frame. Consider a model on the frame F i for which the forcing in all nodes except the root is the same as in K, and no variables are forced at the root. I( σΓ ⇒ σ∆) and I(σS) are refuted at the root for all S ∈ G, so L σI (G | Γ ⇒ ∆) and we are done. Note that the extra boxes in the interpretation I of hypersequents is essential here, since we cannot conclude that G is not forced at the root, but we can for I (G).
and let F be the frame of K. L is mono-extensible and reflexive, so F r is an L-frame with a reflexive root r. By the reflexivity of r and since K forces σ( Γ ), r forces σ(A) ↔ σ( A) for all A ∈ Γ . Hence r forces {σ(A) ↔ σ( A) :
Notice that we have considered here only logics that are either reflexive or irreflexive, meaning that logics such as K4.2 lacking these properties are currently beyond our scope (although we believe that very similar methods should suffice for such cases). We now turn our attention to establishing completeness for fitting calculi, restricting our attention (at least to start with) to the single-conclusion case. First, we show that L-derivable sgh-rules are also GAML-derivable.
Lemma 2. Let L be a mono-extensible modal logic and let GAML be L-fitting. If L R, then GAML R for any sgh-rule R.
But then since we are above K4, using the modal deduction theorem:
GAML is L-fitting, so by repeated applications of (PJ) h , GAML G H as required.
Our task now is to reduce the L-admissibility of a gh-rule to the admissibility of more manageable gh-rules. We introduce the following notions:
-modal-irreducible if G contains only variables and boxed variables.
-modal-semi-irreducible if G contains only variables and boxed variables, and on the left of sequents possibly also equivalences of the form p ↔ p. -full with respect to a set of rules X if whenever R 1 , . . . , R n /R is an instance of a rule in X, then R i ⊆ R for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (i.e. applying a rule in X backwards to R adds no new sequents to the gh-rule).
It is an easy task (see e.g. [9] ) -essentially following from the soundness of the usual logical rules for modal logics -to show that the left logical rules are all L-invertible.
Moreover, each such rule (working upwards) removes an occurrence of a logical connective from a sequent in a hypersequent on the left. Hence, if we define the complexity of a sequent as the multiset of complexities (number of symbols) of its formulas, and the complexity of a gh-rule as the multiset of complexities of its sequents, then it is a standard inductive proof to show the following:
Lemma 3. Each L-admissible gh-rule can be derived from an L-admissible modalirreducible gh-rule using the left logical rules.
But now notice that there is a finite number of different semi-modal-irreducible sequents built from a fixed set of variables. Hence applying any number of rules with the subformula property backwards to a modal-irreducible gh-rule will terminate with gh-rules full with respect to that set.
Then every modalirreducible L-admissible gh-rule can be derived using X from a set of semi-modalirreducible L-admissible gh-rules that are full with respect to X. If X does not contain (AC ), then these gh-rules are modal-irreducible.
For the main part of the proof, we again consider only irreflexive and reflexive logics (and single-conclusion gh-rules), treated by the following two theorems:
Proof. The right-to-left direction follows from the definition of L-fitting and Proposition 1. For the left-to-right direction, it is sufficient by Lemma 4 to assume that R = (G H) is an L-admissible modal-irreducible sgh-rule that is full with respect to (V i ) and (AC). Suppose now that:
. If A is inconsistent, then GAML G H follows immediately by Lemma 2. We define: X j1,...,jn = {S 
I(S).
and observe that by distributivity: L C ↔ A. Now we come to the crucial point of the proof. Each irreflexive logic with the FMP contains GL. Suppose that we can show that S∈Xj 1 ,...,jn I(S) is GL-projective or GLinconsistent for each j 1 ≤ m 1 , . . . , j n ≤ m n . For H = {H} or taking H as
But then by Lemma 2, GAML G H as required. Note that the fact that H consists of at most one hypersequent plays a crucial role here.
Hence we have proved the theorem once we have shown that each S∈Xj 1 ,...,jn I(S) is either GL-projective or GL-inconsistent. To achieve this we make use of the result established in [9] , that a modal irreducible gs-rule that is full with respect to (V i ) and (AC) is either projective or inconsistent. I.e. it is sufficient to show that X j1,...,jn H is a modal irreducible gs-rule that is full with respect to (V i ) and (AC). The rest of this proof will consist of a proof of this fact.
We call a set X j1,...,jn minimal if it does not contain a proper subset X h1,...,hn . It suffices to establish the modal irreducibility and fullness with respect to (V i ) and (AC) only for the gs-rules X j1,...,jn H for which X j1,...,jn is minimal. For suppose that there is a X h1,...,hn ⊂ X j1,...,jn for which I(X h1,...,hn ) is GL-projective or GL-inconsistent. Then GAML X h1,...,hn H, and, since X h1,...,hn ⊂ X j1,...,jn , GAML X j1,...,jn H.
Let us fix a minimal D = X j1,...,jn for some j 1 ≤ m 1 , . . . , j n ≤ m n . Clearly D H is modal-irreducible. The following two claims establish the fullness of D H with respect to (V i ) and (AC), which completes the proof.
Claim. D H is full with respect to (V i ).
Proof. Suppose that D contains a sequent ( Γ ⇒ ∆). Then G contains a hypersequent (G | Γ ⇒ ∆). We have to show that it contains a sequent ( Γ ⇒ A) for some A ∈ ∆. By the fullness of G H with respect to (V i ) h , it follows that G contains
. By the definition of D = X j1,...,jn it follows that either ( Γ ⇒ A) belongs to D, in which case we are done, or there is a sequent S in G that belongs to D. But it is not hard to see that in this case there is a set X h1,...,hn , corresponding to a disjunct of C, that is the result of replacing ( Γ ⇒ ∆) in D by S. But then X h1,...,hn is a proper subset of D, contradicting the minimality of D. Observe that we use here the fact that no hypersequent in G, being just a set of sequents, can contain the same sequent twice.
Claim. D H is full with respect to (AC).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the claim above, but let us spell it out nevertheless. Suppose that D contains the sequents (Γ, A ⇒ ∆) and (Π ⇒ A, Σ). We have to show that it contains the sequent (Γ, Π ⇒ Σ, ∆). Observe that G has to contain hypersequents of the form (G | Γ, A ⇒ ∆) and (H | Π ⇒ A, Σ) for some hypersequents G and H. By the fullness of G H with respect to (AC) h , it follows that if D does not contain the sequent (Γ, Π ⇒ Σ, ∆) it has to contain a sequent S from G or H. In this case, replacing the (Γ, A ⇒ ∆) in D by S in case S occurs in G and replacing (Π ⇒ A, Σ) by S otherwise, we obtain a set X h1,...,hn , corresponding to a disjunct of C, that is a proper subset of D, contradicting the minimality of D.
Theorem 6 (Ghilardi [4] ). For Kripke models K 1 , . . . , K n , let ( i K i ) denote the Kripke model obtained by attaching one new node below all nodes in K 1 , . . . , K n where no variables are forced. A class of Kripke models K has the extension property if for every finite family of models K 1 , . . . , K n ∈ K, there is a variant of ( i K i ) in K. A formula is IPC -projective iff its class of Kripke models has the extension property. Figure 4 displays the gs-rule calculus GAMI for Intuitionistic Logic of [9] . In this case it is the (non-invertible on the right) implication rules that use new variables on the left.
Theorem 7 ([9]
). GAMI R iff |∼ IPC R for any gs-rule R.
Just as we stepped from extensible to mono-extensible modal logics, so we can step here from a calculus for IPC to calculi for intermediate logics admitting the Visser rules. Note, however, that we require a slightly different (more usual) interpretation of hypersequents. For an intermediate logic L and hypersequent G, we write L G iff L I(G) where I(G) = S∈G I(S). Also, a gh-rule R = (G 1 , . . . , G n H 1 , . .
I(H j ). It will also be helpful to restrict the notion of
